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Abstract
Recent studies suggest that valuing happiness is associated with negative psychological 
health outcomes, including increased depression, in US samples. We aimed to replicate 
these associations in two studies at a UK university (Nstudy one = 151, and Nstudy two = 299). 
Importantly, we also investigated the role of emotional attentional control and habitual 
emotion regulation in the relationship between valuing happiness and depression. In both 
studies, we found that valuing happiness was related to increased depression, confirming 
the link between valuing happiness and depression in a Western country outside of the 
USA. Moreover, our findings indicated that the relationship between valuing happiness and 
depression was strongest in British, rather than non-British participants or participants of 
dual nationality. Further, our findings revealed that valuing happiness and depression were 
indirectly associated via the ability to control attention in emotional situations, perceived 
ability to savor positive experiences, and the extent to which positive emotions feel intru-
sive. Specifically, increased valuing happiness was associated with lower emotion attention 
control and lower savoring of positive experiences, which in turn was related to depressive 
symptoms. These results show that the impaired ability to respond adaptively to emotional 
situations and to enjoy positive events may underlie the paradoxical relationship between 
valuing happiness and low well-being.
Keywords Valuing happiness · Emotion regulation · Emotion attention control · Savoring 
beliefs · Depression
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1 Introduction
Happiness is important for functioning and well-being; it promotes goal achievement, facil-
itates interpersonal interactions, and enhances physical and emotional health (Duckworth 
et al. 2005; Lyubomirsky et al. 2005). Most people consider happiness an important goal 
(Rusting and Larsen 1995; Tamir and Ford 2012). However, emerging evidence regard-
ing the impact of valuing happiness on psychological well-being and ill-health is conflict-
ing, and subject to cross-cultural variation, even between samples from different Western 
countries (Ford et  al. 2015a). In the present paper, we aimed to extend this research by 
investigating whether and why increased valuing of happiness may be associated with psy-
chological ill-health in two studies conducted in the UK.
1.1  Valuing Happiness and its Paradoxical Relations to Psychological Health 
Outcomes
Models of goal pursuit posit that valuing a goal is crucial to successful goal attainment 
(Custers and Aarts 2010), thus greater valuing of happiness should lead to better psycho-
logical wellbeing. Such models are supported by cross-cultural studies showing greater life 
satisfaction in countries where positive emotions are highly valued (Bastian et al. 2014), 
and evidence suggesting positive associations between prioritizing pleasure, life satisfac-
tion (Seligman et al. 2005), and well-being (Catalino et al. 2014). However, valuing happi-
ness has also been shown to paradoxically decrease reported rates of happiness and well-
being (Mauss et  al. 2011). Excessive value placed on happiness, that is, wanting to feel 
happy very frequently and to an extensive degree (Ford et al. 2015b), has been positively 
associated with symptoms of major depression (Ford et  al. 2014) and bipolar disorder 
(Ford et al. 2015b), increased loneliness, and weakness in social connections (Mauss et al. 
2012). Such associations appear specific to the excessive valuing of happiness, rather than 
increased valuing of positive emotions more generally (Ford et al. 2014). These findings 
have also been experimentally replicated (e.g. Mauss et al. 2011), such that the experimen-
tally induced valuing of happiness resulted in decreased happiness in response to positive 
stimuli, and increased disappointment in their emotional state. This suggests that extreme 
valuing of happiness may contribute to the development and maintenance of disorders such 
as depression (Mauss et al. 2011).
1.2  Emotion‑Related Goals and Control of Attention in Emotional Situations
In the present paper, we tested several potential mechanisms by which associations 
between extreme valuing of happiness and poorer psychological health may occur (cf. Ford 
and Mauss 2014; McGuirk et  al. 2018). First, individuals who place greater importance 
on achieving happiness may consequently become hypervigilant towards any external and 
internal emotional events (cf. Ford and Mauss 2014; McGuirk et  al. 2018). Indeed, pre-
vious research has shown that people’s motivations and goals determine their attentional 
focus. Specifically, people attend to positive events that presumably help them to achieve 
a desired emotional state but also to negative events that might stop them from achieving 
this state (Wadlinger and Isaacowitz 2011; Vogt et al. 2017). For instance, people attend 
to positive events when wanting to feel better (Xing and Isaacowitz 2006). However, peo-
ple might also pay more attention to negative events. For instance, people pay attention 
to threat when aiming to avoid it (Vogt et  al. 2017). Such goal-driven attention can be 
Wanting to Be Happy but Not Knowing How: Poor Attentional Control…
1 3
counter-productive because of a dysfunctional attention bias to negative events. For exam-
ple, aiming to suppress disgust enhances attention to disgust (Vogt and De Houwer 2014; 
see also Bardeen and Daniel 2017). Applied to the present context, there are several ways 
how such hypervigilance towards emotional stimuli could lead to depression. For exam-
ple, people might fail to adaptively control attention and focus on goals and tasks at stake 
because they are distracted by their feelings or by emotional information in their environ-
ment. Such failure in the control of attention most likely will lead to problems in achiev-
ing goals and tasks which in turn could lead to increases in depression. Indeed, impaired 
attentional control has been repeatedly associated with a range of mental health conditions 
including anxiety and depression (e.g. Barry et al. 2013). Further, heightened attention to 
negative input has been shown to enhance negative feelings and depression (Van Bocks-
taele et al. 2014) and impaired attentional control has been shown to limit disengagement 
from stressful situations (Lenaert et al. 2016). Thus, in the present study we used the emo-
tional attentional control scale (eACS; Lenaert et al. 2016) to assess whether individuals 
with extreme valuing of happiness may struggle with attentional control (i.e., the ability to 
focus and shift attention) in negative emotional contexts, leading to increases in depressive 
symptoms.
1.3  Valuing Happiness and Emotion Regulation Abilities
Valuing happiness to an extreme degree may also be associated with use of emotion reg-
ulation strategies that are related to depressive symptoms (Aldao et  al. 2010; Ford and 
Mauss 2014). Emotion regulation is an intrinsic part of emotional responding, encompass-
ing multi-faceted attempts to influence the nature, magnitude, and duration of emotions 
through heterogeneous actions (Gross 1998). Effective and successful emotion regulation 
flexibly utilizes strategies targeting both positive and negative emotions (Koole 2009). 
First evidence suggests that valuing happiness excessively impairs emotion regulation. 
For instance, inducing social norms that emphasize the importance of happiness promotes 
rumination over failure (McGuirk et al. 2018). Valuing happiness to an extreme degree is 
also associated with lower perceived ability to regulate negative emotions effectively (Fer-
gus and Bardeen 2016; Bardeen and Fergus 2019). If people who excessively value happi-
ness feel less able to regulate emotions effectively, they might choose emotion regulation 
strategies that appear easier. We therefore tested whether excessive valuing of happiness is 
related to maladaptive emotion regulation strategies such as suppression or avoidance and 
decreased use of adaptive strategies such as reappraisal and expression because adaptive 
strategies are perceived as more effortful and difficult (Milyavsky et al. in press).
Relatedly, individuals who inflexibly strive to increase happiness, regardless of context, 
may adopt strategies such as avoidance or suppression because of their expected short-term 
benefits, which in the longer term may prove detrimental (e.g. choosing not to study for an 
exam avoids short-term anxiety, but subsequently increases negative emotions when faced 
with an exam for which an individual is unprepared). We implemented questionnaires that 
measure adaptive (reappraisal, expression) and maladaptive emotion regulation strategies 
(suppression, avoidance) towards both negative and positive emotions because recent evi-
dence suggests that those who endorse more extreme valuing of happiness report using 
higher levels of both maladaptive and adaptive strategies in response to positive emotions 
(Gentzler et al. 2016). We also tested whether valuing happiness might be associated with 
experiencing of positive emotions as intrusive.
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Much evidence illustrates how maladaptive emotion regulation strategies could lead to 
depression. For example, suppression, in which emotional expression or experience is pur-
posefully minimized, has been consistently linked to poorer mental health outcomes than 
reappraisal, whereby individuals change the way they think about a situation to change 
their emotional response (e.g. Aldao et  al. 2010). Reduced expressivity in response to 
stimuli (e.g. Renneberg et  al. 2005), and increased cognitive and experiential avoidance 
(Blalock and Joiner 2000; Cribb et al. 2006) are also associated with depression. Further, 
increased intrusion of positive emotions has been previously linked with symptoms of 
depression (Bower et al. 2015), and may lead to counterproductive regulation of positive 
emotions (e.g., avoidance, suppression, dampening) to minimize their disruption in non-
emotional domains (e.g., task performance). In study 1, we (pre-) tested our hypotheses. 
We conducted a second study with a larger sample and additional measures in order to 
replicate and extend our findings.
2  Study 1
The present study first sought to replicate the previously reported associations between 
valuing happiness and depressive symptoms (e.g. Ford et  al. 2014) in two studies at a 
UK university. While valuing happiness has been negatively associated with well-being 
in American participants it has been positively associated with well-being in Russian and 
East Asian samples, and not associated with well-being in a German sample (Ford et al. 
2015a). It is therefore important to test whether the association can be found in other West-
ern countries outside of the USA.
Next, we assessed the atemporal mediating1 effects of emotional attentional control and 
several commonly used, adaptive and maladaptive emotion regulation abilities and strate-
gies (Koole 2009; Sheppes 2014) on these associations. Specifically, we assessed partici-
pants’ level of attentional control in response to external and internal emotional events. 
Further, we measured participants’ use of suppression, in which emotional expression or 
experience are minimized; reappraisal, whereby emotional experiences are thought of dif-
ferently, leading to altered emotional responding (Gross 1998) using the Emotion Regu-
lation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross and John 2003). Since the experience and enjoyment 
of positive emotions might be most central to the association between valuing happiness 
and psychological wellbeing (Bryant 2003; Mauss et al. 2011), we implemented an addi-
tional questionnaire measuring the regulation of positive emotions, that is, trait expression, 
avoidance, and intrusiveness (i.e. the extent to which individuals feel that positive emo-
tions interfere with other areas of functioning (Bower et al. 2015) of positive emotions). 
We hypothesized that valuing happiness will be associated with greater endorsement of 
lowered emotional attentional control and of maladaptive emotion regulation strategies and 
abilities, that is, increased avoidance, suppression, and intrusion and reduced expression 
and reappraisal in response to both negative and positive emotions, which in turn will lead 
to higher levels of depressive symptoms.
1 Atemporal mediation analysis is a term used for mediation analysis on cross-sectional data to indicate the 
correlational rather than longitudinal nature (Winer et al. 2016).
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2.1  Method
2.1.1  Participants
Two hundred and three participants were recruited to a study investigating the role of 
goals, emotion regulation and depression on attention to positive and negative information. 
One hundred eighty-three of these participants completed the measures relevant to the cur-
rent study, but after data cleansing (to account for repeated participation),2 data from 151 
individuals (23 males; mean age = 20.8 years, SD = 3.2) were analyzed. Participants were 
undergraduate students, and received course credit for participation. Ethical approval for 
both studies was provided by the School of Psychology and Clinical Language Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee at the University of Reading, UK.
2.1.2  Measures
All measures showed good reliability (see Table 1 for Cronbach’s alphas).
The Emotional Attentional Control Scale (eACS; Barry et al. 2013) consists of 14-items 
assessing voluntary control of attention in emotional situations and showed good reliabil-
ity in the current study (see Table 1). Participants rate items such as ‘I am able to put my 
feelings aside when I need to focus’ on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (almost never) to 4 
(always). Items are summed to provide a total score.
The Valuing Happiness Questionnaire (VH; Mauss et al. 2011) consists of seven items 
measuring tendency to value happiness (e.g., I would like to be happier than I generally 
am) that are rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). Items are averaged to generate a mean valuing happiness score.
The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross and John 2003) consists of 
10-items measuring use of two emotion regulation strategies: reappraisal (e.g., I control 
my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in) and suppression (e.g., 
I keep my emotions to myself) on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). Items in each subscale are summed to generate overall scores for reap-
praisal and suppression.
The Positive State-Trait Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (STERQ-P; Bower et  al. 
2015) provides a validated measure of regulation of positive emotions. The 11-item trait 
scale comprises three subscales: Emotional Intrusion (e.g., My feelings make it difficult to 
concentrate), Avoidance (e.g., I want to avoid the situation by trying to escape) and Expres-
sion (e.g., It is easy for me to show my feelings), measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 
1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Items in each subscale are summed to provide subscale 
totals.
Beck’s Depression Inventory-Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck et  al. 1996) is a 21-item 
questionnaire measuring current levels of depressive symptoms and is answered on a 
scale of 0 (e.g. I do not feel sad) to 3 (e.g. I am so sad or unhappy that I cannot stand it). 
Answers are summed to create a composite depressive symptom score, with scores of 0–13 
indicating minimal, 14–19 mild, 20–28 moderate and 29–63 suggesting severe depression.
2 The online survey for study 1 allowed repeated participation. Because participants had to create an anon-
ymous code for part 2 of this study, we were able to identify these instances and use the data from the first 
participation only. Participants in study 2 could only take the survey once.
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2.1.3  Procedure
After filling out the informed consent, participants completed the questionnaires in the 
order shown above via an online anonymous survey administered using Qualtrics (2017) 
software (www.qualt rics.com).
2.1.4  Statistical Analysis
Descriptive statistics and correlations were computed using SPSS version 22 (IBM 2013), 
and Structural Equation Models were tested using AMOS (v. 24; Arbuckle 2016). Maxi-
mum likelihood was used to estimate model fit, with estimates for indirect effects specified 
using Visual Basic (Amos, v. 24; Arbuckle 2016). The significance of direct and indirect 
paths (Preacher and Hayes 2008) were assessed using unstandardized estimates (standard-
ized estimates also presented in Table 2) and bootstrap resampling procedures with 5000 
Table 2  Standardized and unstandardized estimates and standard errors for all pathways, and bias-corrected 
bootstrap confidence intervals for the indirect effects
In Study 1, N = 151; in Study 2, N = 299; BC = Bias-Corrected Bootstrap; CIs = Confidence Intervals; 
VH = Valuing Happiness; REA = Reappraisal; SUP = Suppression; INT = Emotional Intrusion subscale 
(STERQ-P); eACS = emotion Attention Control Scale; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; SBI-L = Latent 
variable for Savoring Beliefs Inventory (SBI)
Path Standardized 
estimates (β)
Unstandard-
ized estimates 
(B)
SE BC bootstrap, 95% 
CIs
p
Study 1
Direct
 VH → BDI (without mediators) .54 4.65 .87 [2.90, 6.37] .001
 VH → BDI (with mediators) .26 2.30 .72 [.99, 3.81] .001
Indirect
 A = VH → BDI (via SUP) .05 .46 .17 [.18, .91] .002
 B = VH → BDI (via eACS) .17 1.47 .44 [.77, 2.54] .001
 C = VH → BDI (via eACS and REA) .03 .28 .12 [.09, .60] .003
 Total Indirect .25 2.22 .50 [1.36, 3.39] .001
Total (Direct + Indirect) .52 4.53 .87 [2.72, 6.15] .001
Study 2
Direct
 VH → BDI (without mediators) .38 4.37 .61 [3.43, 5.42] .007
 VH → BDI (with mediators) .05 .61 .61 [− .31, 1. 69] .308
Indirect
 A = VH → BDI (via eACS) .08 .97 .33 [.45, 1. 51] .015
 B = VH → BDI (via INT) .02 .33 .18 [.12, .83] .013
 C = VH → BDI (via eACS and INT) .02 .25 .13 [.09, .59] .018
 D = VH → BDI (via SBI-L) .12 1.36 .35 [.93, 2.20] .003
 E = VH → BDI (via eACS and SBI-L) .07 .81 .20 [.57, 1.31] .002
 Total Indirect .33 3.73 .56 [2.92, 4.83] .005
Total (Direct + Indirect) .38 4.35 .61 [3.44, 5.40] .007
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samples (95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval [CI]) (Amos, v. 24; Arbuckle 
2016)).3 
2.1.5  Structural Equation Modeling
We established an initial structural equation model which contained all paths from valuing 
happiness to eACS and the subscales of ERQ and STERQ and from them to depression 
(based on the recommendations of recent studies such as Ford et al. 2014, 2015a, b). Due 
to the poor model fit, pathways were modified based on theoretically driven associations 
and model modification indices.
2.2  Results
Valuing happiness was significantly positively correlated with depressive symptoms. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and details of associations between valuing happi-
ness, emotion regulation, and depression for both studies 1 and 2. Below we report direct 
and indirect pathways and comparisons of indirect paths between valuing happiness and 
depression (unstandardized estimates (B) reported in text, with both unstandardized (B) 
and standardized betas (β) provided in Table 2).
The structural model tested whether valuing happiness and depression were directly 
and indirectly associated through emotion regulation strategies. In the first step, the model 
showed poor fit indices (χ2 [15] = 176.43, p = .001, GFI = .80, RMSEA = .27), but in the 
next step after theoretically based modifications it indicated excellent fit (χ2 (4) = 5.44, 
p = .24, GFI = .99, RMSEA = .04). After removing the nonsignificant pathways, the final 
model (Fig.  1; Table  2) also had an excellent fit, χ2 (14) = 16.25, p = .29, GFI = .97, 
RMSEA = .03, with a significant direct relationship between valuing happiness and depres-
sion both with and without atemporal mediators (B = 2.30, 95% CI [.99, 3.81], p = .001 and 
B = 4.65, 95% CI [2.90, 6.37], p = .001 respectively). Emotion attention control (B = 1.47, 
95% CI [.77, 2.54], p = .001) and suppression (B = .46, 95% CI [.18, .91], p = .002) both 
individually exerted partial mediation over the link between valuing happiness and depres-
sion. Increased valuing happiness was associated with greater endorsement of suppression 
and lower eACS. Both were subsequently associated with increased symptoms of depres-
sion. Finally, we found a double mediating effect in which valuing happiness was asso-
ciated with low eACS which in turn was associated with reduced reappraisal. This was 
subsequently associated with increased depressive symptoms (B = .28, 95% CI [.09, .60], 
p = .003).
3 Test of normality assumptions indicated that except for avoidance on STERQ-P and BDI in study 1 all 
the values of skewness and kurtosis in both studies were within the acceptable range of − 1 to 1 (Tabach-
nick and Fidell 2013). In study 1, the values of skewness and kurtosis of avoidance and BDI were under 
the acceptable threshold (skewness < 2, kurtosis < 7; Byrne, 2010), respectively. However, Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2013) suggest that in large samples, the deviation of skewness and kurtosis from normality does not 
make a substantive difference in analysis, thus no transformations were conducted.
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2.3  Conclusion
The present results replicate the association between excessive valuing of happiness and 
heightened levels of depression in a sample at a British university. Importantly, valuing hap-
piness and depressive symptoms were associated through heightened use of a maladaptive 
emotion regulation strategy, suppression, and impaired attentional control. Further, there was 
a cross-sectional double mediation between attentional control and reappraisal: Valuing hap-
piness was associated with poorer attentional control and less use of reappraisal which in turn 
was associated with increased depressive symptoms. This suggests that valuing happiness is 
associated with impaired attentional control in response to internal and external emotional 
events and with dysfunctional use of some of the investigated emotion regulation strategies 
and abilities.
Fig. 1  Structural equation models of study one indicating standardized solutions. Only significant path-
ways are shown within the models. VH = Valuing Happiness; REA = Reappraisal; SUP = Suppression; 
INT = Emotional Intrusion subscale (STERQ-P); AVO = Emotional Avoidance subscale (STERQ-P); 
EXP = Emotional Expression subscale (STER-Q); eACS = emotion Attention Control Scale; BDI = Beck 
Depression Inventory; *p < .05; **p < .01
 B. Mahmoodi Kahriz et al.
1 3
3  Study 2
In study 2, we used a larger sample to attempt to replicate the findings from study 1. We 
also controlled for levels of hypomania to exclude the possibility that heightened levels 
of positive emotions (i.e. symptoms of mania) underlie the association between valuing 
happiness and depression. Additionally, we assessed participants’ nationality to investi-
gate whether effects differ between British participants and those from other countries 
who are currently residing in the UK.
Finally, we also examined participant’s perceived ability to savor positive experiences 
in their daily lives. The adaptive experience and enjoyment of positive emotions in eve-
ryday life may be central to the association between valuing happiness and psychologi-
cal well-being (Bryant 2003; Mauss et al. 2011). For example, people who report higher 
levels of savoring in response to positive life events experience more happiness, less 
depression (Gentzler et al. 2016), and greater life satisfaction (Quoidbach et al. 2010). 
Indeed, valuing happiness has previously been associated with increased endorsement 
of savoring in response to positive events (Gentzler et al. 2016), suggesting that valu-
ing happiness should be associated with increased positivity. However, endorsement of 
strategies does not provide information regarding proficiency of use. Indeed, individuals 
who value happiness more highly have a lower perceived ability to regulate their nega-
tive emotions (Fergus and Bardeen 2016; Bardeen and Fergus 2019) but this remains 
untested for positive emotions. Further, those who excessively value happiness may set 
unrealistic standards for the frequency, duration, and intensity of their happiness (Ford 
and Mauss 2014). For instance, participants who were experimentally induced to value 
happiness more, enjoyed a positive movie sequence less than those in the control group 
(Mauss et al. 2011). Thus, these unrealistic happiness goals may result in a reduced per-
ceived ability to savor in response to positive events, similar to the lower perceived abil-
ity to regulate negative emotions seen previously (Fergus and Bardeen 2016; Bardeen 
and Fergus 2019).
We therefore aimed to test whether individuals that value happiness to an extreme 
degree endorse being less proficient at savoring positive experiences, thus displaying 
decreased enjoyment of positive emotions in everyday life. To this end, we added an 
assessment of perceived savoring ability in response to positive life events.
3.1  Method
3.1.1  Participants
Two hundred ninety-nine UK-based undergraduate students (28 males; mean 
age = 19.56  years, SD = 2.03) participated in the study in exchange for course credit. 
Most participants were British, 73.2% (N = 219), and 7% (N = 21) indicated that they 
were of dual nationality. Of the remaining non-British participants, 51% were European 
(predominantly Eastern European, Irish, and German), 40% were from Asian countries 
(mainly Malaysia and Middle Eastern countries), 7% were African (predominantly Mau-
ritanians), and 2% were Australian.
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3.1.2  Measures
Measures were the same as in study 1, with two additional scales included. All showed 
good reliability (see Table 1).
The Savoring Beliefs Inventory (SBI; Bryant 2003) is a 24-item scale measuring beliefs 
about savoring ability. It comprises of three subscales: anticipation (e.g., I feel a joy of 
anticipation when I think about upcoming good things), savoring the moment (e.g., I 
know how to make the most of a good time) and reminiscence (e.g., I enjoy looking back 
on happy times from my past) on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). Scores from each subscale are summed to give an overall total savoring 
ability.
Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale (ASRM; Altman et  al. 1997) is a 5-item self-report 
measure that assesses symptoms of mania on a scale of 0 (e.g. I do not feel more self-
confident than usual) to 4 (e.g., I feel extremely self-confident all of the time). Answers are 
summed to create a composite mania symptom score.
3.1.3  Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants completed questionnaires via online an 
anonymous survey administered using the University of Reading undergraduate recruit-
ment system (SONA; https ://rdg-psych ology .sona-syste ms.com).
3.1.4  Statistical Analysis
Descriptive statistics and correlations were computed using SPSS version 22 (IBM 2013), 
and Structural Equation Models were tested using AMOS (v. 24; Arbuckle 2016). Maxi-
mum likelihood was used to estimate model fit, with estimates for indirect effects speci-
fied using Visual Basic (Amos, v. 24; Arbuckle 2016). The significance of direct and 
indirect paths between independent and dependent variables (Preacher and Hayes 2008) 
were assessed using unstandardized estimates (standardized estimates also were presented 
in Table 2) and bootstrap resampling procedures with 5000 samples (95% bias-corrected 
bootstrap confidence interval [CI]) (Amos, v. 24; Arbuckle 2016)) (see Footnote 2).
The role of nationality as a moderator in the relationship between valuing happiness and 
depression was tested using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes 2013; unstandardized 
estimates (B) reported in text, with both unstandardized estimates (B) and standardized 
estimates (β) provided in Table 2).
3.1.5  Structural Equation Modeling
In study two we replicated the final model of study one, adding in savoring beliefs, mania 
and nationality, in which the effects of mania and nationality were controlled. As in study 
one, step two included the removal of non-significant pathways. In this study, we added 
new pathways to SBI, avoidance and expression. In addition, new correlations between val-
uing happiness and measurement errors of anticipating and reminiscing were added to the 
model. Moreover, we added correlations between measurement errors of emotion regula-
tion strategies and SBI, anticipating and avoidance, eACS and both reminiscing and antic-
ipating to the model. Also, we added a correlation between measurement errors of SBI 
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and mania. It should be mentioned that these modifications were based on the associations 
recommended in previous studies (Bryant 2003; Ford et al. 2015a, b) and modification fit 
indexes.
3.2  Results
Valuing happiness was significantly positively correlated with depressive but not mania 
symptoms. The structural model tested the same pathways as study 1, with savoring beliefs 
Fig. 2  Structural equation models of study two indicating standardized solutions. Except for the covari-
ates of nationality and ASRM with VH, the direct paths from nationality and ASRM to BDI (used 
as control variables), and the direct path of VH to BDI, only significant pathways are shown within the 
models (the direct path of VH to BDI, was initially significant without addition of indirect paths). 
VH = Valuing Happiness; REA = Reappraisal; SUP = Suppression; INT = Emotional Intrusion subscale 
(STERQ-P); AVO = Emotional Avoidance subscale (STERQ-P); EXP = Emotional Expression subscale 
(STER-Q); eACS = emotion Attention Control Scale; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; SBI-L = Latent 
variable for Savoring Beliefs Inventory (SBI); ANT = Anticipating subscale (SBI); SAV = Savoring the 
Moment subscale (SBI); REM = Reminiscing subscale (SBI); NAT = Nationality; ASRM = Altman Self-
Rating Mania Scale; *p < .05; **p < .01
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as additional mediator and nationality and mania as control variables. The model dem-
onstrated a good fit, χ2 (41) = 53.12, p = .09, GFI = .97, RMSEA = .03 (Fig.  2; Table 2). 
The direct relationship between valuing happiness and depression was initially significant 
(B = 4.37, 95% CI [3.43, 5.42], p = .007; see also Table 2), but became insignificant with 
the addition of mediators (B = .61, 95% CI [− .31, 1. 69], p = .308). Analysis of indirect 
pathways indicated that eACS (B = .97, 95% CI [.45, 1. 51], p = .015), intrusion (B = .33, 
95% CI [.12, 83], p = .013), and savoring beliefs (B = 1.36, 95% CI [.93, 2.20], p = .003), all 
individually mediated the effects of valuing happiness on depression.
In addition, the study demonstrated a double mediation effect of eACS and intrusion 
on the relationship between valuing happiness and depression (B = .25, 95% CI [.09, 
59], p = .018), in which valuing happiness was associated with low levels of eACS and 
increased emotional intrusion, which was associated with heightened depression. We 
similarly found a double mediation effect of eACS and savoring beliefs on the association 
between valuing happiness and depression (B = .81, 95% CI [.57, 1.31], p = .002), in which 
valuing happiness was associated with low levels of eACS and reduced perceived savoring 
ability, which was associated with increased depression.
The control variables mania (B = − .188, 95% CI [− .47, .06], p = .211) and national-
ity (B = 90, 95% CI [− .74, 2.45], p = . 342) did not have significant effects on depression. 
In addition, the covariations between mania and valuing happiness (B = − .11, 95% CI 
[− .38, .12], p = .329) and nationality and valuing happiness (B = .01, 95% CI [− .02, .06], 
p = .482) were not significant.
3.2.1  Effects of Nationality on the Relationship Between Valuing Happiness 
and Depression
As shown in Table  3 and Fig.  3, nationality significantly moderated the relationship 
between valuing happiness and depression (F (1, 294) = 5.16, p < .05, ∆R2 = .014). Spe-
cifically, the relationship between valuing happiness and depression was more pronounced 
positive for British participants (B = 4.91, 95% CI [3.62, 6.21], p = 0.001), compared to 
non-British (B = 4.08, 95% CI [2.91, 5.25], p = 0.001) and dual-nationality participants 
(B = 2.59, 95% CI [.74, 4.44], p = 0.006).
Table 3  Interaction of valuing happiness and nationality predicting depression
N = 299; Regression analysis included mania as a covariate. VH = Valuing Happiness; NAT = Nationality; 
ASRM = Altman Self-Rating Mania Scale; 95% CI = Confidence Intervals
Parameter Standardized 
estimates (β)
Unstandardized 
estimates (B)
SE t p 95% CI (unstandard-
ized)
Predictors of depression
VH .36 4.08 .59 6.85 .001 [2.91, 5.25]
NAT .06 .68 .89 . 76 .44 [− 1.08, 2.45]
VH x NAT − .21 − 2.46 1.08 − 2.27 .023 [− 4.59, − .33]
ASRM − .05 − .62 .16 − 3.69 .001 [− .95, − .29]
Conditional effects of valuing happiness on depression between nationalities
British .43 4.91 .65 7.46 .001 [3.62, 6.21]
Non-British .36 4.08 .59 6.85 .001 [2.91, 5.25]
Dual-nationality .22 2.59 .93 2.76 .006 [.74, 4.44]
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4  General Discussion
Our results revealed significant associations between valuing happiness and depressive 
symptoms in two studies conducted at a university in the UK. These are the first studies 
to replicate such relationships in a Western country outside of the USA. Further analy-
ses found strongest associations between valuing happiness and depressive symptoms in 
British, rather than non-British participants or those of dual nationality. This supports the 
assumption that associations between valuing happiness and low well-being are cultur-
ally bound (Ford et al. 2015a; Tsai 2007). One reason for this may be the increased value 
placed on high-arousal positive emotions in Western cultures (Gruber et  al. 2011). The 
discrepancies between ideal and actual levels of high-arousal positive emotions may lead 
to more negative psychological outcomes such as depression, which is not replicated in 
Eastern cultures (Gruber et  al. 2011). Additionally, people in Western cultures are more 
motivated to define happiness in terms of personal achievements and outcomes, creating an 
individual, rather than social focus (Gruber et al. 2011). Consequently, this reduced social 
connection may lead to lower well-being and more negative psychosocial outcomes such 
as loneliness in Western countries (Mauss et  al. 2012). In contrast, in cultures that pro-
mote socially engaged definitions of happiness (e.g. “helping others” and “spending time 
with friends and family”) valuing happiness is associated with increased well-being (Ford 
et al. 2015a). For example, in Russia or East Asia valuing happiness was positively associ-
ated with wellbeing while it was not associated with wellbeing in a German sample (Ford 
et  al. 2015a). Future work could explore this assumption further through experimentally 
manipulating valuing of happiness in response to a range of different positive emotions and 
emotion-inducing stimuli.
In study 1, the association between valuing happiness and depressive symptoms was 
partially and atemporally mediated by lower emotional attentional control and maladap-
tive use of emotion regulation strategies such as the heightened use of suppression and 
lowered use of reappraisal as measured by the ERQ. After testing a much larger sam-
ple and including an additional measure of savoring responses to positive situations we 
found a full, atemporal mediation of this association in study 2. Specifically, we found 
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Fig. 3  Depression as a function of participants’ nationality (British, non-British and dual nationality) and 
valuing happiness (low, medium and high). Values depict estimates at ± 1 SD for levels of valuing happiness
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that increased endorsement of valuing happiness was associated with lower attentional 
control (eACS) in response to external and internal emotional events. Further, we also 
found that the association between valuing happiness and depression was fully mediated 
through two double mediations: eACS and increased emotional intrusion of positive 
emotions; and eACS and reduced perceived savoring ability. Unlike study one, there 
was not a significant indirect association between valuing happiness and depression via 
suppression and reappraisal in the second study. Further supplementary investigation of 
correlations between the emotion regulation measures indicated that perceived savor-
ing ability was strongly correlated with reappraisal and suppression (Table S1). Hence 
it is likely that these non-significant findings are due to the substantial shared variance 
between these measures.
Importantly, the results from both studies highlight a strong role for impaired eACS in 
the relationship between valuing happiness and depressive symptoms. Emotional atten-
tional control refers to the ability to direct and focus attention in the presence of emotions 
(Barry et al. 2013). Impaired eACS reflects distraction by both internal emotional events 
and external emotional stimuli. The result suggests that people who excessively value hap-
piness might monitor both positive and negative emotional events to a maladaptive degree. 
This will most likely impair achievement of focal tasks and goals or will induce negative 
affective states when hypervigilance to negative content occurs (Lenaert et al. 2016; Van 
Bockstaele et al. 2014). We hope that future research will extend this finding by using tasks 
that measure actual attention allocation to emotional events as part of a valuing happiness 
manipulation.
Interestingly, the findings from both studies suggest that this type of executive control is 
not only impaired when valuing happiness to an extreme degree but might also be required 
for the successful implementation of other emotion regulation abilities and strategies (cf. 
Ochsner and Gross 2005; Rothbart et al. 2014). However, it is also possible that poor eACS 
may be the result of ineffective emotion regulation. For instance, previous research sug-
gests that individuals who valued happiness more, also reported increased endorsement of 
all emotion regulation strategies (regardless of effectiveness; Gentzler et al. 2016). Exces-
sively valuing happiness may result in selection of inappropriate emotion regulation strate-
gies, or inadequate implementation of appropriate emotion regulation, resulting in emo-
tions becoming overwhelming (cf. Bardeen and Fergus 2016; Bardeen and Fergus 2019). 
In such instances, the ability to control attention in the face of these emotions may become 
compromised. If such emotions are negative, an inability to direct attention away from pre-
cipitating factors, or towards positive events may subsequently be associated with increased 
depressive symptoms.
Further, the results highlight the importance of people’s perceived ability to enjoy posi-
tive emotions or situations. Despite previous evidence suggesting valuing happiness is 
associated with increased use of savoring (Gentzler et al. 2016), our findings show that per-
ceived savoring ability is reduced when valuing of happiness is high. As with attentional 
control, mechanisms underlying such effects require further investigation. Potentially, a 
perceived inability to regulate positive emotions leads individuals to adopt a ‘kitchen sink’ 
approach, in which they try an abundance of regulation strategies in the hope that some-
thing will be beneficial (cf. Gentzler et  al. 2016) without being successful or perceiving 
to be successful at any of these strategies. Conversely, increased valuing of happiness may 
be associated with unrealistic expectations for positive emotions (Ford and Mauss 2014), 
thus inability to attain these unrealistic standards may result in a lower perceived ability 
to savor. This mechanism also has empirical support from experimental research in which 
induced valuing of happiness impaired reactions to positive situations (Mauss et al. 2011).
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Our models also support the presence of a double, atemporal mediation of eACS and 
emotional intrusion in the relationship between valuing happiness and depressive symp-
toms. Both constructs measure the extent to which emotions interfere with other aspects 
of an individual’s functioning, making their co-occurrence within the model unsurprising. 
However, the emotional attentional control questionnaire (Barry et al. 2013) focuses pre-
dominantly on negative emotions, and has no items directly addressing positive emotional 
events. Conversely, the intrusion subscale within the STERQ-P focuses exclusively on pos-
itive emotions (Bower et  al. 2015). Taken together, these suggest that valuing happiness 
may result in greater emotional interference in the functioning of other domains (including 
attention), regardless of the valence of the emotional stimuli.
5  Limitations
There are several limitations to our research that future studies should address. First, our 
samples were limited to mostly female undergraduate students which restricts the gener-
alization of the findings. However, previous studies did not find gender effects associated 
with valuing happiness (Mauss et  al. 2011). Second, our research was cross-sectional, 
preventing robust causal inferences. For example, as explained above, it is possible that 
compromised eACS could also be the result of maladaptive emotion regulation resulting in 
emotions becoming overwhelming. Similarly, the association between valuing happiness 
and depression may be bidirectional, as depressed individuals who experience low levels 
of happiness may place higher importance on becoming happier again. Therefore, further 
longitudinal and multi-method experimental work is needed to understand the mechanisms 
underlying these associations (cf. Cole and Maxwell 2003; Maxwell and Cole 2007). It is, 
however, important to notice that our results were consistent across two studies, and in line 
with previous findings.
6  Conclusion
In sum, the present research suggests that valuing happiness and depressive symptoms 
were associated indirectly through impaired emotional attentional control and maladaptive 
emotion regulation strategies (e.g., reduced ability to savor positive experiences and high 
levels of intrusion of positive emotions) in two studies conducted in the UK. We hope that 
future research will further investigate how emotion-related values and goals impact cogni-
tive and regulatory processes in response to emotional events. Ultimately, this line of work 
may help to improve the prevention and treatment of affective disorders such as depression.
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